

ethical argument. As Rogge states, 'I don't like the idea that people have to go into chambers, that's not my idea of sport, it is artificial, I don't like the idea' (cited in Magnay, 2002). Larry Bowers, senior managing director of the US Anti-Doping Agency, also considers their use unacceptable, stating that 'My position is that since [the devices] are artificial, and not everyone has access to them, they are unethical' (cited in De Simone, 2002). Notably, Bowers' argument has to do with access and equity and Rogge's seems more premised upon the potential for harm.

With these emerging voices, it seems imminent that altitude chambers will become illegal in more contexts. Yet from Rogge's and Bowers' articulation of why these innovations might be problematic, there is further reason to be concerned about the direction of anti-doping policy. From each of their statements the arguments resort to the kinds of perspectives most prevalent in the 1960s, where anti-doping policy was built on what is or is not (loosely termed) 'natural'. Nevertheless, Rogge's and Bowers' statements reveal one of the more problematic aspects of developing policy about performance modification. They each highlight one of the niggling facts about not condoning an *anything goes* attitude to performance enhancement in sport – that it matters how excellence in performance is achieved. When pressured for a justification of an ethical view on performance enhancement, it is common to hear appeals to founding concepts such as 'naturalness', 'integrity', 'essence' and so on. Yet this is precisely the kind of perspective that has proven quite insufficient to ensure a rigorous ethical evaluation of performance modifiers. Consequently, the challenge is to try to redevelop an ethical theory about performance modification in sport.

Given the difficulties of maintaining a coherent policy against doping, genetic modification would further complicate the problem. One of the main questions of the present issue is whether such attempts at removing the doped athletes from sport is at all justified or even worthwhile. Key questions need to be asked about the specific nature of genetic modification and how it is to be classified and evaluated; whether as a method of doping (illegal) or perhaps like altitude chambers (legal). In this respect, in order to address the ethical implications of genetics and the broader questions of anti-doping, there is a need to move beyond a sports policy discourse and even beyond a sports ethical perspective. Rather, it is necessary to situate the arguments explicitly within a moral discourse, which recognises that sporting values do not necessarily trump other kinds of values to which athletes may also make a legitimate claim. In short, a philosophy of harmonisation has very little value unless there is agreement about why such policies should exist in the first place.

It is this perspective which provokes the current chapter title 'Forget drugs'. The title intends to reflect the idea that genetics and other emerging technologies will present far greater (and perhaps insurmountable) challenges to doping policy in sport than any other forms of performance modification have thus far. It is also used to recognise that the arguments underpinning the rejection of doping in sport are premised upon highly contested terms. This would seem a rather confrontational statement given the strength of anti-doping efforts around the